

DD/A Registry

File

04M 1-2

DDA 77-2733

13 May 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Printing and Photography
Division

ATTENTION :

FROM :

Assistant for Information, DDA

SUBJECT :

Notes From The Director No. 2

1. Attached are notes covering the following subjects which the DCI desires to be published as Notes From The Director No. 2.

- a. Small Group Meetings
- b. The Moore Trial
- c. The Boyce Trial
- d. Remarks of Ambassador Harlan Cleveland
- e. Fire at Intelligence Community Headquarters Building

2. I realize that even by utilizing type setting for production of the Notes, we may have space problems. If necessary, you may drop publication of the item dealing with the fire at the IC Headquarters Building. It is the DCI's desire that these Notes be distributed on Monday, 16 May.

STATINTL

Attachments: a/s

AI/DDA [redacted] dc (13 May 1977)

Distr [redacted]

Original - Addressee w/atts

- ✓ - DDA Subject w/atts + background (DDA 77-2713 & 2741)
- 1 - DDA Chrono
- 1 - HGB Chrono

SMALL GROUP MEETINGS

As part of my efforts to learn more about our Agency and to identify matters which its employees consider important and meriting my personal attention, I have met with several small groups of representative employees both here at Headquarters and at our major training site. I want to do this to an even greater degree in the future, and I have initiated action throughout the Agency to organize such groups and to arrange the necessary scheduling.

It is my desire that the matters discussed in these meetings with me be determined by the members of the group involved and, to this end, I have asked that each group meet several times prior to meeting with me. At these meetings, the members can collectively identify those items which they believe are most worthy of discussion. What I hope will result from these meetings is ideas for constructive changes which can possibly improve the Agency or its product. I do not believe that any of us are interested in change for the sake of change alone or in hearing endless complaints for which no constructive solutions are offered. I am hopeful that future meetings will be as informative and constructive as those I already held, and that we will be able to develop some sound improvements as a result.

THE MOORE TRIAL

On 5 May 1977, a Federal jury found former CIA employee, Edwin G. Moore II, guilty of attempting to deliver information affecting the national security to the Soviet Union after he threw a package containing several Agency documents over the fence of the Soviet residence in Washington, D. C. Moore was also found guilty of four other charges relating to the unauthorized retention and theft of classified documents. Moore was arrested by the FBI on 22 December 1976 after he picked up what he believed to be the initial \$3,000 he had demanded from the Soviets in return for the package of documents. He had instructed the Soviets to deliver a second payment of \$197,000 later that same day in exchange for additional documents. The rapid arrest and successful prosecution were the result of extremely close cooperation between the Agency, the FBI and the Department of Justice and demonstrated our commitment to fully prosecute any instances where an attempt is made, successful or not, to disclose classified Agency information to unauthorized recipients. Although the prosecution involved a public trial, the disclosure of names of covert Agency employees or other information which would damage sensitive intelligence sources and methods was avoided.

The Moore case, and particularly the background on Mr. Moore's CIA career, have already been the objects of vigorous study and analysis within the Agency. They will continue to be so. From what is known so far, it is probable that the case will lead in the future to some significant modifications in personnel processing and evaluation systems.

THE BOYCE TRIAL

After less than four hours deliberation, a U.S. District Court jury returned a guilty verdict against Christopher John Boyce, a former employee of an Agency contractor, TRW Systems, Inc., on 28 April 1977 on all eight counts of the indictment including violation of U.S. espionage statutes. The counts included conspiracy to transmit defense information to a foreign power, disclosure of classified information (Communications Intelligence), theft of U.S. Government property, and failure to register as an agent of a foreign power. Boyce was first employed by TRW in July 1974 and was authorized access to very sensitive U.S. Government and Agency classified information in November 1974. Boyce remained employed by TRW until 17 December 1976 when he voluntarily resigned.

Although the conviction of Boyce was not achieved without some damage to Agency sources and methods, this case clearly demonstrates our determination to protect sensitive intelligence information from unauthorized disclosure by aggressively seeking criminal prosecution whenever such action is warranted. As with the Moore case, the circumstances surrounding the Boyce case have and will continue to be subjected to thorough analysis and study by the Agency. Analysis to date has revealed several areas in relation to the Agency's industrial contracts and security practices which can and will be improved upon.

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After less than four hours deliberation, a U. S. District Court jury returned a guilty verdict against Christopher John Boyce, ^{former} ~~an~~ ^{an Agency contractor,} ~~employee of~~ ^{TRW Systems, Inc.} ~~under contract to the Agency,~~ on 28 April 1977 on all eight counts of the indictment including violation of U. S. espionage statutes. The counts included conspiracy to transmit defense information to a foreign power, disclosure of classified information (Communications Intelligence), theft of U. S. Government property, and failure to register as an agent of a foreign power. Boyce, ~~former employee of an Agency contractor, TRW, Inc.~~ ^{TRW} was first employed by ~~that company~~ in July 1974 and was authorized access to very sensitive U. S. Government and Agency classified information in November 1974. Boyce remained employed by TRW until 17 December 1976 when he voluntarily resigned.

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Remarks of Ambassador Harlan Cleveland, CIA Auditorium, 10 May 1977

In his remarks Tuesday, Ambassador Cleveland addressed the issue of ethics and security in government. Secrecy, he said, is unquestionably necessary at times in both foreign and domestic affairs. However, because the need for secrecy can be easily rationalized, it is sometimes imposed for the wrong reasons and can influence policy adversely. He argued that the smaller the circle of policy-makers who "need to know," the more unlikely dissenting opinion will be heard and a full range of options explored. The benefits of security must always be weighed in light of the national interest which is sometimes better served by free and open debate.

Regarding efforts to codify ethical standards for the actions of the Intelligence Community or any other government agency, he agreed the task was worth undertaking but was indeed difficult; that too broad standards would not be helpful to the person faced with a difficult decision, and too restrictive standards would have to be so encumbered with exceptions that they would also not be helpful. He suggested instead that we consider a question he uses to test whether or not a contemplated action meets his ethical standards:

If this action is held up to public scrutiny, will
I still feel that it is what I should have done and
how I should have done it?

FIRE AT INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HEADQUARTERS BUILDING

As was reported in the press, a fire broke out in the recently occupied Intelligence Community Headquarters Building on Saturday morning, 7 May. The fire started within a communications equipment cabinet in the unattended communications equipment room. The location and the nature of the fire presented unusual problems both because of the fact that the fire was in a secured area and also because it involved electrical wiring which, as it burned, gave off highly dangerous toxic fumes. It is to the distinct credit of the D.C. Fire Department and the occupants of the building that the fire was quickly extinguished and was contained within one equipment cabinet.

I am pleased not only with the performance of the Intelligence Community people during the fire but also by the highly professional and cooperative efforts of GSA and our Offices of Logistics, Security and Communications in quickly restoring the affected office areas for normal utilization. Through these efforts, the areas affected by smoke were cleaned, the damaged equipment was removed and the secure telephone service linking this building with other parts of the community was restored so that the building was ready for use by the opening of business on the following Monday.

DDA 77-2741

Approved For Release 2001/05/23 : CIA-RDP80-00473A0003000800

Date: 12 May 1977

TO: DDA

FROM: EA/DCI

SUBJECT:

REMARKS:

Item for Director's Notes on
Ambassador Cleveland.

Please deliver ASAP - for Monday's
issue.

STATINTL



Attachment

*p.e. don't do anything
you don't want printed
on the first page of*

Approved For Release 2001/05/23 : CIA-RDP80-00473A0003000800

V. Born 10/2/1944

ACTION

Remarks of Ambassador Harlan Cleveland, CIA Auditorium, 10 May 1977

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77-4278

11 MAY 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : John F. Blake
Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT : Recommended Notes From the Director

1. Action Requested: Your approval to publish ~~the~~ ^{STATINTL} four attached notes as "Notes From the Director No. 2."


2. Background: In consultation with [REDACTED] we have developed the attached four notes for publication. Given the fact that the original "Notes From the Director" was quoted in the press, we have deliberately written these notes on the assumption that they too will be subject to being quoted in the newspaper. As a result, they may appear more bland than would otherwise be desirable, but we see no way in which this can be avoided.

3. Recommendation: It is recommended that you ~~approve~~ ^{STATINTL} the publication of these four items as "Notes from the Director No. 2."

[REDACTED]

John F. Blake

Attachments: a/s

APPROVED: 
Director of Central Intelligence

DISAPPROVED: _____
Director of Central Intelligence

DATE: 12 MAY 1977

Approved For Release 2001/05/23 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080008-7

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

11 May 77

Re Mr. Blake's comments to the effect these "Notes" appear "bland", I for one find them not so at all - in fact, they are rather stimulating, particularly as they are unclassified. With the exception of the second note (straight info on the IC Bldg fire) each contains definite indications of forward movement in the last paragraphs. It is possible the DCI can improve them, but it seems to me they strike very good notes.

Approved For Release 2001/05/23 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080008-7

DG

SMALL GROUP MEETINGS

As part of my efforts to learn more about our Agency and to identify matters which its employees consider important and meriting my personal attention, I have met with several small groups of representative employees both here at Headquarters and at our major training site. I want to do this to an even greater degree in the future, and I have initiated action throughout the Agency to organize such groups and to arrange the necessary scheduling.

It is my desire that the matters discussed in these meetings with me be determined by the members of the group involved and, to this end, I have asked that each group meet ~~at least once prior~~ ^{several times prior} to meeting with me. At these ~~initial~~ meetings, the members can collectively identify those items which they believe are most worthy of discussion. ~~It should be emphasized that what it is hoped~~ ¹⁶ will result from these meetings ~~are beneficial~~ ^{is} ideas for constructive changes which can possibly improve the Agency or its product. I do not believe that any of us are interested in change for the sake of change alone or in hearing endless complaints for which no constructive solutions are offered. I am hopeful that future meetings will be as informative and constructive as those I have already held, and that we will be able to develop some sound improvements as a result.

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I am pleased not only with the performance of the Intelligence Community people during the fire but also by the highly professional and cooperative efforts of GSA and ~~the~~ ³ ~~Office~~ of Logistics, Security and Communications in quickly restoring the affected office areas for normal

utilization. Through these efforts, the areas affected by smoke were cleaned, the damaged equipment was removed and the secure telephone service linking this building with other parts of the community was restored so that the building was ready for use by the opening of business on the following Monday.

THE MOORE TRIAL

Former CIA employee

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Moore was indicted on only two of the documents — a portion of a January 1973 Agency telephone directory which was in the package thrown over the fence, and an entire April 1973 Agency telephone directory recovered from his

residence. Both of these documents, together with certain other classified documents introduced as evidence during the trial, were placed under seal by the court at the beginning of the trial and, thus, were not available for examination by the public or the press. Of further interest, although the prosecution involved a public trial, the disclosure of names of covert Agency employees or other information which would damage sensitive intelligence sources and methods was avoided.

The Moore case, and particularly the background on Mr. Moore's CIA career, have already been the objects of vigorous study and analysis within the Agency. They will continue to be so. From what is known so far, it is probable that the case will lead in the future to some significant modifications in personnel processing and in evaluation systems.

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Although the conviction of Boyce was not achieved without some damage to Agency sources and methods, this case clearly demonstrates our determination to protect sensitive intelligence information from unauthorized disclosure by aggressively seeking criminal prosecution whenever such action is warranted. As with the Moore case, the circumstances surrounding the Boyce case has and will continue to be subjected to thorough analysis and study by the Agency. Analysis to date has revealed several areas in relation to the Agency's industrial contracts and security practices which can and will be improved upon.



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INTERNAL
USE ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL



SECRET

Approved For Release 2001/05/23 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080008-7

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Recommended Notes From the Director

FROM:

John F. Blake
DDA
7D-26, Hqs.

EXTENSION

5454

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

DCI

12 May ST/My

2.

3.

DDA

4.

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10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

STATINTL



5375

Approved For Release 2001/05/23 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300080008-7

FORM
3-62

610

USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS

SECRET



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